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Abstract
Companies tend to outsource logistics services for
flexibility or platform operating costs reduction. To do
so, they typically use centralized platforms to delegate
the services procurement process. However, those
platforms can be prone to information asymmetries
between carriers and shippers which can lead to
sub-optimal procurement outcomes. A more transparent
and efficient way to manage the procurement of logistics
services between carriers and shippers could be a
decentralized platform based on blockchain and smart
contracts. In this paper, we design, implement, and
evaluate the potential for a decentralized logistics
services procurement system, following a design science
research approach. In so doing, we contribute by
(1) developing such a decentralized logistics services
procurement system that addresses the allocation
problem, and (2) developing a set of nascent design
principles guiding the elaboration of decentralized
procurement mechanisms on blockchain.
1. Introduction
Transport logistics is a complex process with many
stakeholders involved that need to be coordinated to
send a shipment from A to B. A central activity
in that process is the freight transportation service
procurement (FTSP) mapping, where shippers negotiate
their transport needs with potential carriers. The FTSP
activity challenge is to map the shipper delivery request
with the best available carrier offer at a certain time and
place (i.e., finding a match and issuing a contractual
binding). Shippers can use dedicated platforms to find
on-demand carriers to deliver merchandise [1]. For
logistics services, the right mapping at the needed
quality level is crucial, as the delivery quality impacts
directly customer satisfaction and retention.
In this paper, we define problem owners as logistic
companies involved in procurement mechanisms. The
problem is worth exploring as shippers oftentimes
struggle to find qualified carriers as information
asymmetry in procurement marketplaces is strong [2, 3].
Indeed, existing procurement marketplaces frequently
lack information transparency: for example, access
to delivery histories, or allocation protocol can be
restricted. As a consequence, data integrity of the
carrier profiles may not be assured, or important services
records may not be kept [2]. Moreover, the freight
procurement platform controls all information flows
which gives it a lot of centralized power and an
incentive to keep the mapping of logistics services
nontransparent for others [3]. A procurement platform
provider may feel incentivized to abuse their power
to keep things nontransparent. One example is the
so-called opaque (pricing) business model, whereby
companies or platforms hide the (low) price of products
to generate higher revenue (e.g., Priceline). This
situation creates yet another problem, as the quality of
services (QoS) provided by carriers is not accessible
freely by shippers. The lack of transparency of service
allocation, influenced by information asymmetries, may
lead to poor customer satisfaction. A study conducted
among 300 retailers across the UK, US, and Germany in
2018 demonstrates that the average yearly cost of failed
deliveries per retailer is almost £200,000 [4]. Thus,
FTSP mapping requires a technology that (1) leverages





trusted delivery information to compute the QoS of
carriers, (2) fosters power balance between partners, and
(3) optimize the FTSP process.
The blockchain has emerged in the past years as
a new tool for trustworthy decentralized data storage
and decision making [5, 6] with a potential for
lower operational and transaction costs [7]. The
blockchain ledger stores transactions in a tamper-proof
fashion and smart contracts execute predefined protocols
autonomously. Moreover, oracles can feed the
blockchain with trustworthy external data: the
blockchain connects to a number of oracles to
triangulate the status of transaction outside the
blockchain system.
A blockchain-based decentralized logistics services
procurement marketplaces thus appears as an adequate
technology to provide an efficient FTSP protocol with
smart contracts securing the mapping and settlement
of a logistics service in an efficient, finite, and
autonomous way [8, 9, 7]. For accounting and
compliance, such a system can even record all settled
transactions in a tamper-resistant fashion, and keep track
of delivery information provided by different oracles
and tracking sensors. Such a decentralized procurement
solution executed by smart contracts would improve the
carrier-shipper mapping decision-making as well as the
QoS. More precisely, the decision-making regarding the
choice of the carrier would be improved as the protocol
would be transparent and based on tamper-proof QoS
data whose computation is agreed upon by all partners.
The decision-making would be based on objective data
and improve customer satisfaction on the long run.
Moreover, the decision making would be beneficial for
the carrier as her profile is put on equal footing with
respect to other carriers.
Despite several publications of blockchain-based
allocation protocols to map logistics services and their
procurement, there is a research gap when it comes
to incorporating information flows from oracles and
tracking sensors. Thus, in our research, we focus
on the efficient mapping of logistics services on a
decentralized platform where information about QoS
is available and incorporated into the procurement of
logistics services and their mapping between shippers
and carriers. Particularly, in this research we answer
the following research questions: (RQ1) How can
blockchain-based FTSP mapping assist shippers in the
procurement of a logistics service with regards to
process effectiveness, information transparency, and
power balance between platform providers and platform
actors? (RQ2) Which design principles need to be
followed that guide the development of decentralized
procurement mechanisms?
We investigate these questions by following a design
science research approach anchored in the logistics
field. We propose a blockchain-based FTSP mapping
adapted to logistics to enhance the sector’s needs for
service flexibility and information transparency. The
main contributions of this work comprise the list of the
main requirements related to FTSP and derive a priori
principles and features to match the procurement needs,
as well as the design of an artifact holding the features
that validates our approach through two evaluation
cycles. Additionally, we contribute theoretically to
the FTSP literature on blockchain use. To do so, we
propose a set of design principles for the elaboration
of decentralized FTSP, adapted to shippers needs. The
three design principles are understandability of the
mapping process by shippers, FTSP automation, and
sensitive mapping metrics privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 introduces key concepts around
blockchain-based FTSP mappings. Section 3 reviews
related work. Then, section 4 presents the design
science research methodology approach. In section 5,
we describe the blockchain-based FTSP mapping design
requirements and define the design features needed
for blockchain-based FTSP mapping. We present our
practical and academic contributions derived from the
iterative design cycles in section 6. The paper concludes
with section 7.
2. Preliminaries
This section introduces some key concepts
about FTSP and the blockchain technology, before
investigating related work on decentralized allocation
protocols using blockchain.
The freight transportation procurement process is
one of the primary activities in the logistics field. The
FTSP holds three stakeholders: the shipper (i.e., the
service buyer) who initiates the allocation request, the
carrier (i.e., the service seller) who sells its delivery
services, and an intermediary, often a digital platform,
responsible for the carrier-shipper allocation [10, 11].
The allocation request concerns two market types:
long-term markets, which are delivery contracts signed
for years, for example, and spot markets concerning
one-shot agreements for a single specific request. It
comprises two stages: first, the matching stage, where
the set [service request/resource provider] is defined,
and then the allocation, which generates a mediation
contract, the CMR (i.e., CMR Convention: Convention
on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods
by Road). In a coopetition context [12, 13], both
carriers and shippers are looking to cooperate for cost
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optimization and efficiency gains [10, 14]. Especially,
carriers can also use the platforms to exchange on-hand
merchandise. Indeed, platforms optimize transportation
costs and enact allocations autonomously. Multi-modal
freight transportation among carriers is a practical
example. It is worth noting that the platforms’
service procurement process will be the same for either
shipper-to-carrier or carrier-to-carrier allocations.
A blockchain is a distributed database based on
a peer-to-peer network, i.e., a database spread across
multiple nodes, or servers [15]. Blockchains keep
track of the transfer of assets between several parties.
They lower the cost of trusted transactions by making
databases tamper-proof by design [16]. Blockchain
systems store data transactions hierarchically,
using linked blocks of aggregated transactions [5].
Cryptography hashes and asymmetric encryption
enforce the non-tampering of the transactions. The
trusted behavior of blockchain systems builds upon
the consensus protocol used to update the chain of
blocks. The consensus protocol states the strategy
used to settle on a shared state of truth. This protocol
ensures the tamper-proof growth of the database [5].
Smart contracts are deterministic scripts enforcing a set
of agreements between parties in the blockchain [17].
Smart contracts can use oracles to connect to off-chain
data, coming from sensors or databases [18].
Design science research refers to a scientific method
to develop artifacts answering real-world problems [19,
20]. Its interest lies into the methodology making sure
that the identification and specification of the underlying
problem are realized, leading to its resolution at some
level of completeness and abstraction. Consequently,
stakeholders and their problem are considered before
designing a solution. The finality of a design science
research approach is to abstract design knowledge to
generate theoretical insights framing the building of
future solutions. A design science research approach
comprises the three main steps. The first step refers to
the analysis of the problem leading to generating a set of
objectives. A set of features are then derived from these
objectives. The second step is to develop and evaluate
the artifact iteratively. The third step is to abstract design
knowledge under a set of design principles.
3. Related-work
Compared to traditional allocation systems,
blockchain-based allocation protocols unlock
trustworthy process automation [9, 21, 22]. Indeed,
integrity of the protocol can be ensured as all carriers
are considered before attributing a request, while
historic data stored in the blockchain is tamper-proof.
When a conflict occurs, the history of transactions can
be retrieved and used as the single source of truth.
Blockchain-based FTSP mappings can moreover go one
step further by managing autonomously and reliably the
end-to-end service enactment.
Table 1 presents the main known related work
investigating blockchain support for allocation
procedures. On the one hand, several papers investigate
the use of blockchain and smart contracts for the
autonomous allocation of services such as energy
or computation power [23, 24, 25, 2, 26]. These
papers leverage smart contracts for autonomous
contractualization [24, 2], incentives to encourage
service completion [25, 2], or delivery settlement [27].
However, these papers do not focus specifically on
the FTSP use case, and do not use oracles to compute
QoS ratings or integrate sensor feedbacks. Moreover,
these artifacts were not realized using a design science
research approach and thus do not provide design
principles for developing decentralized procurement
mechanisms on blockchain. On the other hand, several
papers propose a design science research approach
to investigate the use of blockchain applications.
Two papers, [28, 29], focus respectively on the
development of blockchain-based IoT applications and
smart-parking. However, the retrieved design principles
do not concern FTSP mappings specifically, and oracles
are not integrated in the research works. Two design
science research papers, [30, 31], focus on the use of
blockchain for logistics but do not focus specifically
on the FTSP protocol. The first paper focuses on the
management of bills of lading via blockchain. Retrieved
design principles are process digitization, tamper-proof
storage, accessibility, and user authentication. The
second paper focuses on food supply chains; the
retrieved design principles are mainly related to data
privacy and keeping sensitive data off-chain. It is also
to note that none of the retrieved work leverages oracles
to realize a QoS-based allocation.
Thus, in this research, we address this research gap
regarding the potential of decentralized FTSP mapping
using blockchain, smart contracts, and oracles. We do
so using a design science research approach.
4. Design science research methodology
We follow a design science research approach
to elaborate a blockchain-based FTSP mapping (cf.
section 2) answering the needs of shippers striving
to find the most qualified delivery drivers in open
and dynamic markets. Our rationale for choosing the
design science research approach is the scarcity of (1)
decentralized procurement mechanisms on blockchain,
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[23, 24, 25, 2, 26, 27] no yes no no
[28, 29] no no no yes
[30, 31] yes no no yes
Our approach yes yes yes yes
and (2) FTSP field evaluations in the blockchain
literature. In road transport fully digital CMR
(e-CMR) is far from standard recognized by e.g.
custom authorities in many regions/countries. In the
experiments, we make the assumption that e-CMR
digitization is accepted and the norm.
First, we analyze the literature regarding FTSP
to analyze the problem, propose a list of design
requirements to answer FTSP-related issues, merge it
into a set of three design objectives, and decline each
objective into a set of features. Next, we start the
prototype development. We proceed with conducting
two iterative development/evaluation cycles.
During the first iteration, we evaluate the artifact
through user testing. We proceed to a moderated
usability test of the prototype. Our goal was to assess
the prototype with the maximum and diverse problem
owner representatives. We proceeded to the tests with
master students of the Service-oriented architecture
field. to palliate the difficulty to experiment with
the logistics industry. We tested students as they
were close to shippers, i.e., blockchain agnostic. We
conducted the experiments with the maximum number
of participants to have a diversity of answers, we
obtained 14 answers. During experiments, students
were asked to act as independent shippers. They
followed provided instructions to access the dApp.
Afterwards, they followed a scenario asking them to
find a delivery person fitting a set of requirements.
Afterwards, a questionnaire was given to participants
comprising questions related to their overall feedback,
the dApp industrial applicability, and usability flaws.
The second iteration of the artifact involved two
focus groups. The groups were composed respectively
of two academics in freight transportation and three
industry experts specialized in the procurement process
of logistics services. The choice of interviewing
logistics specialists was motivated by their direct
relation with logistic stakeholders. They hence had a
broad understanding of the variety of issues related to
shippers. Additionally, they were involved in ongoing
projects on digitization of logistic networks in France,
and aware of specific challenges related to blockchain.
Each session followed the same methodology. We
launched a demonstration of the artifact before letting
the experts debate. The focus groups lasted around
one hour each. We did not launch a naturalistic
evaluation in a freight procurement setting as the artifact
is presented as a minimum viable product, designed
to understand how the blockchain can improve current
FTSP mechanisms (cf. [32]).
Finally, we focus on knowledge abstraction and
theory generation. We extracted overlapping semantics
from the testimonies to identify nascent design
principles. We hence propose three nascent design
principles based on our iterative empirical development
and evaluation cycles. Besides, we confront the
proposed nascent design principles under the light of
nascent design principles extracted from other design
science research papers.
5. Designing a blockchain-based FTSP
mapping: from requirements to design
principles and features
5.1. Designing requirements
To get the list of design requirements linked to
enhanced FTSP platforms, we carry out a set of
interviews with academics in freight transportation. We
also query the literature to gather articles related to (1)
FTSP mapping current issues, and (2) blockchain-based
FTSP mapping proofs-of-concept. More precisely, we
generate two subjective search strings [33]. The first one
refers to current FTSP mapping limitations The output
search string is (”freight transportation” OR ”service
procurement” OR ”freight allocation” OR logistics)
AND (challenges OR issues). The second search string
refers to resource allocation and blockchain. The
output search string is (resource allocation OR market
place OR matching OR freight procurement) AND
(blockchain OR DLT OR smart contracts).
We identify five design requirements that a resource
allocation artifact should meet to circumvent current
FTSP mapping issues (R1-R5 hereinafter).
First, a solution must provide allocation flexibility
(R1) to shippers and carriers [10, 2, 34]. On the
shipper side, the shipment flows are variable and costly,
primarily via spot markets. On the carrier side, there
is a need to exchange and re-bundle items effortlessly
with competitors to perform economies of scale (e.g.,
increasing fill rate) and economies of scope (e.g.,
lane exchanges). Second, a solution must provide an
autonomous allocation process (R2) [35, 36, 37]. The
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flexibility is low, and frequently trucks are half-full for
spot deliveries [38]. One of the causes is the heavy load
of administrative tasks, with still paper-based contracts,
e.g., the CMR papers [37]. The third requirement is that
a solution must provide enact real-time payment (R3) to
help carriers optimize their commercial processes and
operating costs [10, 39, 37, 40]. There is a need for
a cost-efficient, secure, and fast payment process right
after delivery on the carrier side [38]. Fourth, a solution
must comply with CMR regulations (R4) [41, 42, 39].
Indeed, the administrative overwork linked to CMRs can
discourage flexible hiring and item re-bundling. Finally,
a solution must provide delivery history integrity and
traceability (R5) [43, 44, 37, 45, 34, 40]. The allocation
should be objective and delivery history should be
traceable. Additionally, carriers and shippers should not
be able to modify or contest a settled delivery.
5.2. Artifact principles
We gather the aforementioned (R1)-(R5)
requirements into three principles (i.e., P1, P2, P3
hereinafter) that a resource allocation artifact should
meet to circumvent current FTSP issues.
First, platform operating costs reduction (P1) of
the FTSP system should be considered to enhance the
transportation process. On the one hand, platform
operating costs reduction relies on an eased allocation
process (cf R2). Fostering autonomous freight
procurement systems would render the procurement
infrastructure less costly for each stakeholder as they
would need to provide less time to administrative
activities (e.g., settling a delivery). On the other
hand, platform operating costs reduction also relies
on allocation flexibility (cf R1). Indeed, customized
allocation requests will be more prone to answer the
shipper’s standards. Consequently, less time will be
spent to finding the perfect carrier for a task, and the risk
for failed deliveries due to poor customer satisfaction
will decrease. Blockchain smart contracts can answer
this need for cost reduction, as they can be used as
autonomous services in untrusted environments [30].
Second, the platform should offer contractual
flexibility (P2). The inner flexibility of the allocation
mechanism ensures contractual flexibility (cf R1). For
example, if the allocation mechanism makes it possible
for freight re-bundling, it will enhance contractual
flexibility. Contractual flexibility is also related to
real-time payment (cf R3). The fast, simple and secure
payment processing enabled by the smart contracts will
make carriers be paid right after delivery to accelerate
the cash flow and flexibility. Real-time payment and
contractual flexibility can be managed by a dedicated
smart contract. The latter could manage offers, and
re-bundle them if needed.
Finally, allocation integrity (P3) should be
considered, be it for the allocation process, the record
of service rates, and the management of CMR. The
integrity of the digitalized CMR (cf R4) is paramount
for regulatory authorities. Integrity in terms of delivery
history and protocol should be considered (cf R5).
Providing adequate performance feedbacks to future
shippers requires delivery history integrity. Meanwhile,
an objective allocation requires protocol integrity:
the protocol should consider all carriers for a given
service request without bias. The integrity of CMRs
and delivery history can be ensured by the tamper-proof
affordance of the blockchain ledger [30]: all approved
transactions cannot be contested nor changed. The
integrity of the allocation is moreover ensured by smart
contracts as they are deterministic: the inner logic of
the smart contract will be respected at each stage of the
allocation process.
5.3. Emerging features
We elaborate a set of blockchain-based FTSP
mapping features to answer the needs for platform
operating costs reduction (P1), contractual flexibility
(P2), and allocation integrity (P3) in FTSP patterns (see
section 6.1 for implementation details).
Regarding platform operating costs reduction (P1),
we propose an autonomous allocation mechanism to
reduce cognitive weights on the user side, coupled to
the generation of a digital CMR agreement. Moreover,
we offer to integrate real-time payment facilities once
the delivery completes. On the shipper side, there are
minimum search actions to find a carrier and enact an
agreement. On the carrier side, the allocation is faster
and requires less paperwork: the overall allocation cost
decreases. Regarding contractual flexibility (P2), we
propose a customizable QoS allocation to the shipper.
The latter can tune each rating’s weights referred to
as PO to compute the carriers’ QoS. The QoS is
calculated as a weighted normalized mean, using both




∥∥POj∥∥ . If a weighting
factor equals zero, then PO is not considered for the
QoS computation. If it equals one, then PO will be fully
considered for the QoS computation. For example, if the
carrier experience is a primary criterion of selection, the
shipper can set a weight of 1 to this parameter. Finally,
concerning allocation integrity (P3), the blockchain
can map carrier offers (e.g., pricing or availability) to
their tamper-proof records of services, accessible via a
dedicated profile smart contract recording the QoS of
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each service. Moreover, a smart contract operates the
allocation to ensure protocol integrity and objectivity:
the carrier with the highest QoS (or the lowest costs or
CO2 emissions, etc.) will obtain the assignment.
Tamper-proof performance feedbacks can have
multiple shapes, e.g., delivery time, temperature
threshold, or customer satisfaction ratings. The
combination of both subjective (customer satisfaction
rating), and objective metrics (temperature threshold or
delivery time) constitute the QoS and thus moderate
poor performance reviews. Moreover, the QoS update
can be computed with a weighted exponential average
that puts more weights on latest deliveries. Additionally,
at initial stages, new comers are assigned with a
maximum QoS rating to avoid the case where they
would never be selected.
The following section presents the findings
generated from the building of an artifact holding these
features.
6. Implementing a decentralized
trust-free FTSP mechanism
In this section, we present the practical contribution
of this research work: the decentralized FTSP prototype.
We then focus on the academic contribution by
discussing the nascent design principles emerging from
the development and evaluation cycles.
6.1. The blockchain-based FTSP mapping
prototype
We propose a blockchain-based FTSP mapping
protocol to fulfil the needs for platform operating costs
reduction, allocation flexibility, and allocation integrity.
The prototype architecture is multi-tiers, with (i) an
application layer, (ii) the backend (smart contract,
oracle) running on a blockchain, (iii) a Rest API for
bridging the application layer with blockchain.
The blockchain-based FTSP mapping process
follows the subsequent steps (cf. Fig. 1). Initially,
representatives from both shippers and carriers
instantiate the FTSP mapping. The representatives state
the metrics that the smart contract will use to compute
the on-chain QoS. Afterward, the carrier-shipper
mapping can occur. Two stakeholders, carriers and
shippers, interact with the FTSP smart contract.
Carriers share with the smart contract eligibility
information (e.g., location, licenses, truck capacity, and
equipment) (step 1.a.). The smart contract associates
this information with initially empty QoS metrics used
to record the history of their past services (e.g., number
of deliveries, and average delay) (step 1.b.). Shippers
trigger the smart contract to find a carrier matching
their needs by specifying filtering criteria (e.g., price,
location, shipping date, equipment, merchandise
volume) and sorting criteria (e.g., preferred experience,
or maximum delay) (step 2.). The smart contract will
filter the candidates (step 3.a.) and delegate the QoS
computations according to the required sorting criteria
to the oracle (step 3.b.-3.c.). The oracle provides to
the smart contract the best-matching carrier (step 3.d.).
Finally, the smart contract generates a digital delivery
agreement as a decentralized version of the CMR
(step 4.). The user (shipper or carrier) can retrieve all
contracts bound to its public address.
The need for an oracle originates from the need
to carry on QoS computations with past services
history stored on the ledger. Such computation cannot
be carried on using a smart contract due to gas
limits imposed by blockchain architectures such as
Ethereum. Thus, an external trusted entity is used
to carry out computation: the oracle triangulates the
results coming from a trusted API query to avoid any
information tampering risk. Regarding the architecture
of the prototype, oracles exchange information with the
blockchain, and end-users exchange information with
the blockchain. Hence there is no more intervention of
a trusted third party.
We refined the prototype following two iterative
cycles. User tests underlined the need to display
computation information to enhance trust in the system.
Indeed the black-box effect appeared, linked to users
using a technology they are not expert with occurs.
Users can only trust the machine, as they do not know
the underlying protocols. This dependency may trigger
mistrust. We thus displayed all resource profiles to
the users and the ratings obtained for each resource.
The second evaluation round consisted of focus group
discussions. Testimonies underlined the need for an
almost entirely autonomous system. We revisited the
artifact by merging the matching and allocation stages
into one single step.
Power asymmetry between carriers and shippers
is addressed through a shared governance which can
take place through an open or consortium blockchain:
each actor participates equally to the consensus
protocol. Information asymmetry is addressed by
making accessible to shippers carriers’ former services
rating on the blockchain ledger. Additionally, power
balance is reached by putting into escrow the carrier’s
pay, as well as the carrier’s caution. Hence, both
the shipper and the carrier are bound after validation
of the mapping. The smart contract enables platform
operating costs reduction by managing allocations
autonomously. The smart contract also allows
contractual flexibility as it speeds cash flow; payment
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Figure 1. Blockchain-based FTSP mapping protocol
is enacted right after the shipping is settled. Finally,
the combination of (1) the blockchain ledger, (2)
the smart contract protocol, and (3) the oracle-based
QoS computations ensures tamper-proof and objective
management of the allocation requests. With the
proposed architecture, oracles share QoS-computation
results with the blockchain, and shippers and carriers
interact directly with the blockchain to manage delivery
requests. Hence, there is no more intervention of a
trusted third party. Thus, carrier-shipper mappings can
be done in a secure, trusted, reliable way by a blockchain
system. As a side note, regarding carrier coopetition,
a carrier wishing to delegate the delivery service to
another carrier can take the role of the shipper. The
generated CMR contracts holds a link to the initial
CMR contract. When the new carrier-carrier CMR is
settled (i.e., the delegated delivery has been fulfilled),
the status of both CMR contracts is set as settled, and
the smart contract transfers the corresponding escrowed
payments. The QoS rating obtained for the delivery is
stored in both carrier profiles.
6.2. Theory generation
In this subsection, we propose three nascent
principles stemming from the prototype development
cycles in order to dig onto the reasons making the
artifact successful [46]. We then discuss these findings
under the light of other design science research papers.
Table 2 presents the three emerging design principles
detailed hereinafter. First, understandability of the
smart contract shipper-carrier allocation is needed
to encourage non-technical users adoption (DP1).
Delegating the allocation process to the blockchain




The smart contract shipper-carrier
allocation protocol must be
displayed to the shipper
Automation
The FTSP process must be carried




The allocation mechanism must
keep sensitive data off-chain in
competitive markets
triggered some concerns during the user testing stage.
More precisely, the use of an oracle raised concerns
related to integrity gains. Having no access to the
decision protocol, several users were puzzled regarding
the end result, as they did not have access to the
smart contract reasoning for such allocation. Thus the
FTSP platform should display the decision protocol
alongside the data output to avoid the technological
black-box effect. The blockchain architecture indeed
requires strong technical skills to understand its
benefits (decentralized governance, tamper-proof data,
autonomous scripts). For non-expert users, the
prototype thus consists of a box where data comes in
(e.g., their delivery request), and data comes out (e.g.,
a shipper/carrier mapping), without any understanding
of what happens inside the box. We propose to
display to the shipper computation outputs for each
profile to counter the black-box issue. Moreover,
automation of the FTSP process is necessary (DP2):
the FTSP process must be carried on in an end-to-end
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fashion by the smart contract. Indeed, one of the
significant benefits underlined by both testers and
experts is process optimization. Experts have made
suggestions for enriched process automation. More
precisely, they foresee blockchain-based FTSP mapping
as autonomous agents managing request bundling,
re-pricing, or matching. To integrate automation
into our artifact, we merge the service request and
contractualization stages into one step. The service
status is tracked and managed within the blockchain for
integrity and efficiency. Nonetheless, oracle latency is
at stake regarding allocation queries, as it can take up
to several minutes to process an request. According
to one expert, ’latency variability seems acceptable
for long-term markets where contracts can be set
for a year or so [...] In spot markets, the service
provider could become unavailable before the end of
the query.’ Thus, the automation of the FTSP mapping
should take into account allocation latency. Finally,
metrics privacy should be considered (DP3). The
allocation mechanism must keep sensitive data off-chain
in competitive markets. On the evaluation side, the
disjunction between private and public data appears in
several testimonies. Such sensitivity needs to adjust
to the market at stake. Price and capacity data are
sensitive and should remain private to other carriers’
eyes. Though our prototype saves QoS metrics to the
blockchain, a better option is to encrypt the price and
volume metrics. We leave it for future work.
These nascent design principles resonate with
several design principles proposed in the design science
research literature. Accessibility of blockchain-based
applications to non-technical users is one of the design
principles of [30]. The design principle (DP1) stands on
the necessity to explain adequately the smart contract
decision-making process to users. Though blockchain
smart contracts prone automation and transparency,
protocol and data trust comes at the condition that users
understand well the mechanisms motivating a decision
(a delivery request allocation here). (DP1) is thus
reinforced as a design principle. Moreover, allocation
automation (DP2) resonates with the need for digitizing
paper-based processes in [30]. The issuance of CMR
contracts implies the production of several paperwork
copies that need to be approved by both shipper and
carrier at the start of the delivery. Consequently, the
paperwork slows down the delivery process, reduces
overall efficiency, and implies tampering risks. (DP2)
also resonates with the potential for smart contracts
to manage processes presented in [29]. (DP2) is
thus also reinforced as a design principle. Lastly,
the privacy of allocation metrics (DP3) resonates with
the need to manage in an off-chain fashion private
and sensitive data. These needs were underlined
in [47] that performed a design science research study
in the trucking industry: private carrier and shipper
information should remain off-chain. The need for
sensitive data privacy is also underlined as a design
principle in [31] and [28]. QoS metrics act as private
and sensitive data in our setting. In the future,
the QoS metrics of our proposed mechanism should
consequently whether be ciphered so that they cannot be
understandable by other competitors, or kept off-chain.
Thus, (DP1-3) can be considered as design principles for
the development of a blockchain-based FTSP solution.
The contribution of this paper to theory lies into
investigating the use of the blockchain in the logistics
industry with respects to coopetition [12]. The current
FTSP related literature mostly focuses on the traditional
carrier-to-shipper market. Little attention has been
paid to carrier-to-carrier market; and the application of
blockchain and smart contract in such market is still a
brand new research topic. The FTSP process is applied
in a cooperative and coopetive environnement as (1)
competing carriers agree to use the same platform to
gain a service auction, and (2) competing shippers agree
to use the same platform to find an adequate carrier.
Both shipper and carrier participants have a shared
interest in using the blockchain-based FTSP platform as
the system has the potential to reduce operational costs,
increase visibility of the carriers, and transparency and
integrity of the deliveries.
7. Discussion, conclusion, and future
work
This paper focuses on answering the need of logistics
services procurement for more effectiveness of the
carrier-shipper mapping process, alongside information
transparency, and power balance. To do so, we
investigate on the potential of the blockchain technology
that offers decentralized and trustworthy scripting
capabilities. To this aim, we carry out a design science
research project focusing on the use of blockchain for
decentralized logistics services procurement.
The paper addresses two research gaps in the
FTSP literature on blockchain use: the scarcity of
blockchain-based freight procurement applications, and
the scarcity of theory-driven considerations. To address
these concerns, we present a prototype that illustrates
how blockchain can help to make carrier-shipper
allocation processes more autonomous, objective, and
trustworthy. The issue of information asymmetry is
addressed as blockchain smart contracts remove the
need for a trusted third party. The tamper-proof
capability of the blockchain ledger answers the need
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for information transparency. Finally, the use of
smart contracts also fosters process effectiveness as
qualitative mappings can be reached through leveraging
blockchain-based carrier QoS. We also provide nascent
design principles for FTSP applications that aim to
mitigate the transactional risk and uncertainty that
is inherent to logistics systems. More precisely,
we derive three design principles for the design of
blockchain-based FTSP mappings based on the study:
understandability, automation, and metrics privacy. The
need for understandability of the mapping process
precises the will for more information transparency
in mapping systems: the access to information must
be linked to an imperative of understanding. The
process automation design principle may answer the
need for power balance and flexibility: the more
autonomous the process, whose steps are agreed upon by
a consortium of shippers and carriers, the more balanced
the overall process. The need for metrics privacy
may however be controversial, as users wish both
information transparency and privacy. A compromise
may be reached with cryptography protocols such as
homomorphic encryption to leverage carriers’ QoS
without revealing sensitive information.
The practical applicability of the prototype may
be prone to reluctance due to the difficult digitization
of the logistics industry. The use of decentralized
applications (dApps) may ease the appropriation of the
proposed system. The dApp can be used by SME
users as a normal app on a smartphone, which connects
to the blockchain. Additionally, smart contracts will
automatize some operations such as billing, hence
the system could fasten the digitization of these
companies. Interoperability between mapping apps
currently generates many tensions today. Blockchain,
or cross-chain technologies could address this practical
issue. In practice, a user could use a mapping dApp,
and provide its data to gain mapping services in a secure
and fast fashion. Furthermore, to fit current logistics
processes, not yet fully digitized, and using a payment
term additionally to the CMR, the notion of real-time
payment could be extended with a digitized payment
term. This payment term would be managed through
a dedicated smart contract, instantiated by the mapping
smart-contract after the e-CMR generation.
Several limitations appear in this prototype.
First, smart contracts use oracles to aggregate
blockchain-available QoS data using an API. Issues
related to API tampering may occur. The oracle could
call independent computation APIs and compare the
results to ensure results integrity. Additionally, a
party wishing to claim a computation failure may use
blockchain data to verify computations. What is more,
we use a public blockchain to demonstrate the feasibility
of the solution, which may lead to an inadequate balance
of powers. To ensure an adequate balance of powers
between shippers and carriers, a future solution would
require a permissioned blockchain dedicated to the
mapping process, whose smart contracts are generated
by a consortium of shippers and carriers. To be close to
the field’s reality, we designed the artifact by extracting
the main allocation metrics used in FTSP. For the user
tests, we gathered a population with no experience of
blockchain. Thus we can assume that their answers are
close to carriers discovering the technology for the first
time. Furthermore, the focus groups comprises logistics
field experts: we can assume that we qualitatively
assessed the potential of blockchain-based FTSP
mapping in the logistics context. Regarding internal
validity and results correctness, we tried to influence
the least possible user testing experiments by letting the
users free to use the application. The focus group panel
was also broad enough to underline the most salient
benefits and challenges of using blockchain-based FTSP
mappings. However, we acknowledge that the logistics
researchers and the industry experts are an estimator
of what happens in logistics services’ procurement
process. At last, the design science research approach is
anchored in a FTSP context, and thus findings are not
generalizable.
An avenue for future work is to leverage our platform
to answer the metrics privacy design principle. To do
so, we plan to investigate on the use of cryptography
methods to cipher the data to be computed for the QoS
in order to preserve procurement privacy.
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